



I am one of very few law professors in the United States who regularly
teaches courses in both bankruptcy law and arbitration law, or more generally,
Alternative Dispute Resolution.1  Apparently, most law professors with a
strong interest in bankruptcy lack a strong interest in arbitration and vice versa.
Perhaps many law professors believe that these two fields, bankruptcy law and
arbitration law, have little in common.  One thing they do have in common,
though, is that they are not Civil Procedure.2
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Federal Rules) are appropriately
central to the study of civil procedure in the United States because they govern
civil litigation in most federal courts and they have greatly influenced state
courts’ rules of procedure as well.3  In important respects, though, the litigation
process in bankruptcy courts differs from the litigation process under the Fed-
eral Rules.  And the bankruptcy litigation process differs from the Federal
Rules in many of the same ways that the arbitration process tends to differ from
the Federal Rules.  This Article explores these similarities between the proce-
dures of bankruptcy litigation and arbitration and contrasts them with the more-
elaborate procedures of ordinary civil litigation under the Federal Rules.
While some of these similarities and contrasts appear on the face of the
various written rules of procedure, others appear only when one looks beyond
the written rules to unwritten customary practices.  In other words, the “law in
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas.  Thanks to Jan Karlin, Chris Drahozal, Henry
Strickland, John Pearson, Keith Sharfman, Bill Brown, and, for research assistance, to
Chadron Patton, Laurel Kupka, Kristin Ballobin, Alex Aguilera, Mike Lee and Meghan
Walsh.
1 Compare ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., 2009-2010 DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1478-83
(2009-2010) (listing teachers of Alternative Dispute Resolution, including Arbitration, Medi-
ation and Negotiation), with id. at 1576-78 (listing teachers of creditors’ and debtors’ rights
courses, including Bankruptcy).
2 Here, I do not mean to take a side in the bankruptcy-is-primarily-procedure debate. See,
e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bank-
ruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 617-20 (2008) (placing bankruptcy theories on a
continuum from “proceduralists,” who view bankruptcy “as a process that sorts out nonban-
kruptcy entitlements, which are largely creatures of state private law,” to “statists” who
“would generally give Congress and bankruptcy courts greater power to adjust debtor-credi-
tor relations.”). See generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy
Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2004) (arguing
bankruptcy is procedure).  Rather than addressing this debate, I am making the (very differ-
ent) claims that appear in the next paragraph of text.
3 See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 910 (1987) (“Approxi-
mately half of the states adopted almost identical rules, and procedural rules in the remainder
of the states bear their influence.”).
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action” differs somewhat from the “law in the books” with respect to proce-
dures in the three forms of adjudication compared here: (1) ordinary civil litiga-
tion, (2) bankruptcy litigation, and (3) arbitration.4
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the procedures of ordinary civil
litigation under the Federal Rules and introduces the concept of “process
costs,” the costs parties incur using a process of adjudication.  Compared to
ordinary civil litigation under the Federal Rules, both bankruptcy litigation and
arbitration use procedures well-suited to providing quicker and cheaper adjudi-
cation, with correspondingly lower process costs.  Part II details some of those
procedures in bankruptcy litigation and contrasts them with ordinary (non-
bankruptcy) civil litigation under the Federal Rules.  Part III details some of the
procedures of arbitration, showing how they resemble bankruptcy litigation
procedures in departing from the Federal Rules in many of the same ways.  Part
IV suggests some questions that might be drawn from these resemblances.  The
first such question is whether the Federal Rules should be amended to become
more like the rules that make bankruptcy litigation and arbitration quicker and
cheaper than ordinary civil litigation under the Federal Rules.  Second, Part IV
asks why a party might choose arbitration over bankruptcy litigation when they
are both similar in the ways they save process costs.
I. THE PROCESS COSTS OF THREE FORMS OF ADJUDICATION
Readers of this Article are likely veterans of a Civil Procedure course, and
so presumably have a basic understanding of ordinary civil litigation under the
Federal Rules and similar state rules of procedure.5  A civil action under the
Federal Rules, if it is not settled or voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff, gener-
ally includes the following procedures:
1. Service of process to commence the action
2. Pleadings (a complaint and, typically, an answer or motion to dismiss)
3. Discovery of information prior to trial
4. Summary judgment motions (in some cases)
5. Trial, and perhaps
6. Appeal6
Of course, these procedures come at a cost to the disputing parties.  A party’s
“process costs” include the time and money that party spends on these
procedures.7
4 Of course, there is nothing new in recognizing that the law in action does not necessarily
correspond to the law in the books. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 14-15 (1910).
5 I do not presume thorough knowledge of the Federal Rules or any other specific rules of
procedure, but rather presume only a rough familiarity with the basic purposes of the six
procedures listed infra note 6 and accompanying text.
6 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 4-18 (Thom-
son/West, rev. 9th ed. 2008) (1968) (outlining the procedure in a civil action).
7 One might also acknowledge as process costs the less-easily-quantified costs of adjudica-
tion, such as “a grueling deposition . . . by hostile lawyers, or a trial in which the client’s
family secrets are exposed to the public.” STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 3.5(b) (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter WARE, PRINCIPLES] .  Process costs
should be distinguished from the costs of paying a money judgment or complying with any
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Compared to ordinary civil litigation under the Federal Rules, bankruptcy
litigation uses procedures well-suited to providing quicker and cheaper adjudi-
cation, with correspondingly lower process costs.  The relative speed of bank-
ruptcy litigation is noteworthy, as it tends to move more quickly than non-
bankruptcy litigation, with a shortened discovery process and an earlier hear-
ing.8  Bankruptcy law professors Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook observe:
[D]etailed fact-finding and dispute resolution is routinely handled by the bankruptcy
courts in a relatively short time.  Courts will usually consider the papers filed by the
parties and schedule an hour or two to hear evidence.  A dispute that might drift
through the state court for years may be resolved within a matter of weeks in a
bankruptcy forum.9
The force of this observation can be appreciated by considering the large num-
ber of cases to which it applies.  Consider, for example, a breach-of-contract
claim in which the defendant contends that it performed, rather than breached,
the contract and, in the alternative, if it did breach then damages are much
lower than the plaintiff asserts.  This fact pattern can serve as the paradigm for
the sort of common, everyday case to which Warren and Westbrook’s observa-
tion about bankruptcy litigation’s speed applies.10  In other words, the speed of
bankruptcy litigation applies not just to the occasional case, but to large num-
bers of the run-of-the-mill cases.  This speed is crucial because “[p]rolonged
case disposition time frequently correlates with an increase in litigation
costs.”11  In sum, process costs generally tend to be lower in bankruptcy litiga-
tion, due to its speed and less elaborate procedures.12
Similarly, the consensus is that arbitration tends to be quicker than ordi-
nary civil litigation13 and thus also likely reduces process costs.14  What War-
other remedy ordered by the court. See Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical
and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 735, 747 (2001) (explaining the difference between the remedy costs and process
costs).
8 Chapter 11—“101”: An Overview of Bankruptcy Litigation, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb.
2004, at 16 (“[T]hings generally move at a much faster pace in bankruptcy than in non-
bankruptcy litigation.”) [hereinafter Overview of Bankruptcy Litigation]; C. Daniel Mot-
singer, Life in the Fire House: Representing Creditors in Bankruptcy Cases, in BANKRUPTCY
LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 97, 107 (2008) (“Bankruptcy litigation tends to move
more quickly, involve a shorter discovery process, [and] get to trial or hearing faster . . . than
other forms of litigation.”).
9 ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDI-
TORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 221 (6th ed. 2009).
10 If the defendant in this contract case is in bankruptcy then the plaintiff’s claim will be
heard as a contested matter. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
11 Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time,
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 814-15 (2000); see also CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS 28 (2d ed. 2006) (“[O]ne would expect cost
and speed to be closely related, if for no other reason than that delay is costly.”).
12 See infra Part II (discussing less elaborate procedures of bankruptcy litigation).
13 Countless lawyers observe that arbitration tends to be faster than litigation. See DAVID B.
LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DISPUTES: A
REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 17, 26 (1998); see also
DRAHOZAL, supra note 11, at 27-28 (quoting LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra, at 26); Arthur D.
Felsenfeld, International ADR Developments: Innovative Approaches to Resolving New
Types of Disputes, in EMERGING APPLICATIONS FOR ADR 41 (2010) (“[I]t is my experience
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ren and Westbrook say above about the speed of bankruptcy litigation, in which
disputes are often “resolved within a matter of weeks,”15 can also be said,
although to a lesser degree, about arbitration.  While most cases in arbitration
are not resolved within a matter of weeks, some are.16  And the general speed
advantage of arbitration over ordinary civil litigation applies not just to the
occasional case, but to large numbers of run-of-the-mill cases, including cases
like the paradigmatic breach-of-contract case noted above.17  In sum, arbitra-
tion generally uses procedures that, like those of bankruptcy litigation, are
that properly managed arbitration can be completed more quickly than litigation.  Few arbi-
trators have a caseload comparable to the overcrowded docket of a state or federal judge and
therefore can more easily accommodate the parties’ desire for a quick resolution to their
disputes.  The fact that discovery tends to be more limited in arbitration also contributes to
the speed of resolution, as well as the cost savings.”); Eric Alan Stone & Jacqueline P.
Rubin, Drafting Corporate Agreements: A Litigator’s Perspective, in DRAFTING CORPORATE
AGREEMENTS 483, 498 (2010) (explaining arbitration “is, generally speaking, faster”); David
S. Steuer, A Litigator’s Perspective on the Drafting of Commercial Contracts, in DRAFTING
CORPORATE AGREEMENTS, supra, at 459, 467 (“Arbitration normally proceeds faster than
litigation . . . .”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 5, 5 n.12 (collecting studies and finding that “business lawyers tend to view
arbitration more favorably than litigation in key categories (fairness, speed to resolution, and
cost).”). But see Christian A. Atwood, Creative Approaches to Financing Private Company
M&A in a Brave New (Unlevered) World, in DEALING WITH M&A FINANCING AND RISK IN
A CHANGING MARKET 25, 33 (2010) (“We usually eschew arbitration due to the unpredict-
ability of the outcome and (at least based on our experience) the fact that arbitration is
usually no faster or less expensive than litigation.”).
14 I have argued that arbitration’s process costs tend to be lower than litigation’s.  Stephen J.
Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—With Particular Consider-
ation of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 258-62 (2006) (collecting
studies); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility:
Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 840 (2008) (“Survey evidence and busi-
ness experience provides some evidence that the total costs of arbitration are lower than in
litigation, but the evidence is too limited to draw definitive conclusions.”); Peter B. Rut-
ledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 579 (2008) (“Virtually all of the
available evidence—studies of analogous regimes, surveys, and case studies—suggests . . .
that arbitration, as a necessary part of a broader fabric of alternative-dispute-resolution pro-
grams, can significantly reduce a company’s process costs.”); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory
Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1268 (2009) (“[L]imits on discov-
ery (and to a lesser extent on pretrial motion practice) hold down the actual costs of arbitra-
tion relative to litigation.”).
15 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 9, at 221.
16 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1731 (2001)
(“At the [cotton industry arbitration tribunal], the rules require the time from filing to the
close of evidence to be between fifteen and thirty days.  Decisions are rendered as soon
thereafter as possible.  At the [Memphis Cotton Exchange], the length of time from filing to
disposition varies but is typically just over a month.”) (footnotes omitted); Michael Peel &
Jane Croft, Arbitration: Case Closed, FT.COM (Apr. 15, 2010, 7:55 PM), http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/1858447c-48be-11df-8af4-00144feab49a.html#axzz1EdSqZYhO (noting the bene-
fits of international arbitration, “Elizabeth Birch, a barrister and arbitrator, says: ‘I was
involved in an IT case in which parties needed an urgent decision—and that was dealt with
in two weeks, compared with what I would estimate could have taken 18 months or two
years in court.’”).
17 See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
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quicker and less elaborate than the procedures of ordinary civil litigation under
the Federal Rules.18
II. BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION PROCEDURE
A. The Basic Context
A “case” in bankruptcy is fundamentally different from a “case” in ordi-
nary civil litigation.19  While an ordinary civil case is adversarial from the start,
as indicated by the caption in the style of Plaintiff v. Defendant, “[a] ‘case’ in
bankruptcy parlance is the bankruptcy as a whole[,]”20 as indicated by the cap-
tion in the style of In re Debtor’s Name.  While a bankruptcy case may have
one or more adversarial “cases-within-a-case,”21 most do not.  “[I]n most bank-
ruptcies, there is no active conflict and the case is ‘administrative’ from start to
finish.”22  If, however, a dispute arises in the course of a bankruptcy case, then
litigation may occur.
The two most common types of bankruptcy litigation are the “adversary
proceeding” and the “contested matter.”23  The distinction between the two is
fundamental to bankruptcy procedure.24  An adversary proceeding25 is an
“ordinary lawsuit that is tried in the federal bankruptcy court under essentially
the same rules of procedure as a ‘civil action’ in a federal district court.”26
18 See infra Part III (discussing arbitration’s less elaborate procedures).
19 8 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON, III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 160:2 (3d ed. 2009).
20 Id.
21 Id. § 160:1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 Id. § 160:2.
23 Id. § 160:3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also LAWRENCE R. AHERN, III &
NANCY FRAAS MACLEAN, BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE MANUAL § 7001:1 (2010) (dividing
bankruptcy disputes into three categories: adversary proceedings, contested matters, and
“administrative proceedings.”); 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 9014.01 (Lawrence P. King
ed., 15th ed. rev. 2010) (dividing bankruptcy disputes into three categories: adversary pro-
ceedings, contested matters, and “administrative matters, in which there is no adversary
party.”).  One might also add “contested petitions.”  Christopher M. Klein, Bankruptcy Rules
Made Easy (2001): A Guide to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that Apply in Bank-
ruptcy, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 35, 36 (2001).  The petition in bankruptcy, which commences a
bankruptcy case, is occasionally contested, most often in the case of an involuntary bank-
ruptcy.  Such contested petitions are “uncommon.” Id. at 42.
24 8 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 19, § 160:5.
25 AHERN & MACLEAN, supra note 23, § 7001:1.  Adversary proceedings include actions to
“determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property”; “determine
the dischargeability of a debt”; “object to or revoke a discharge”; “revoke an order of confir-
mation of a . . . plan”; and most actions “to recover money or property.” See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7001(1), (2), (4)-(6).
26 Klein, supra note 23, at 38; see also 8 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 19, § 160:4 (“The
adversary proceeding is the bankruptcy action that most resembles an ordinary lawsuit under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 9, at 108
(“Adversary proceedings are full-blown federal lawsuits within the larger bankruptcy case
. . . .”); Section 1120(A)(1) Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Interfirst Bank Dall., N.A. (In
re Wood & Locker, Inc.), 868 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Adversary proceedings have
been correctly described as full blown federal lawsuits within the larger bankruptcy case
. . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, “based on the premise that to the extent
possible practice before the bankruptcy courts and the district court should be the same[,]”
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Rules 7001-7087 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the Bank-
ruptcy Rules) contain most of the rules governing adversary proceedings and
these rules “generally incorporate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”27
By contrast, the contested matter is “subject to the less elaborate proce-
dures described in [Bankruptcy] Rule 9014.”28  The contested matter “is, by a
wide margin, the most common form of bankruptcy litigation[,]”29 encompass-
ing many common bankruptcy disputes,30 including, if the defendant is in
bankruptcy, the paradigm breach-of-contract case described in Part I.31
In short, the most common form of bankruptcy litigation, the contested
matter, is, when compared to a civil action under the Federal Rules, character-
ized by less elaborate procedures and an emphasis on speed.  These features
the bankruptcy rules governing adversary proceedings “either incorporate or are adaptations
of most of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 advisory commit-
tee’s note; see also In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 898 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he
bankruptcy rules . . . draw strong analogies between an ‘adversary proceeding’ in bankruptcy
and an ordinary ‘case’ in a district court.”).
In some ways, however, the procedural rules governing adversary proceedings are more
streamlined than those found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  This is true, for exam-
ple, with service of process.  In addition to the methods of service permitted under Federal
Rule 4, Bankruptcy Rule 7004 permits service by first class mail. FED. R. BANKR. P.
7004(b).  Also, service of process is nationwide. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d).  Thus, in bank-
ruptcy cases an adversary complaint can be served anywhere in the United States by first
class mail.  So-called “personal service” by a process server is unnecessary.
27 Scott A. Wolfson, Commentary, A Roadmap for Bankruptcy Litigation, ANDREWS LITIG.
REP. BANKR., Dec. 12, 2008, at 3, 4.  Wolfson further notes: “For example, Bankruptcy Rule
7003 simply states, ‘Rule 3 Fed.R.Civ.Proc. applies in adversary proceedings.’  However,
some of the Bankruptcy Rules differ from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with the
modifications ranging from slight to dramatic.” Id.
28 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 9, at 108; see also Overview of Bankruptcy Litiga-
tion, supra note 8, at 16 (“Contested matters tend to proceed more quickly—and somewhat
less formally—than adversary proceedings, although they can still result in discovery and in
trials before the bankruptcy judge.”).
29 Klein, supra note 23, at 39; see also Wolfson, supra note 27, at 5 (“Most bankruptcy
court litigation practice is conducted through contested matters.”).  For a list of specific
motions, objections and applications defined, or referred to, in the Bankruptcy Rules as con-
tested matters, see Klein, supra note 23, at 39-41.
30 Examples include: relief from the automatic stay, compelling the debtor to turn over
property to a trustee, compelling an estate representative to abandon the estate’s interest in
property, avoiding liens in exempt property, confirmation or modification of a Chapter 12 or
13 plan, and objection to the confirmation of a debtor’s proposed plan. AHERN & MACLEAN,
supra note 23, § 9014:1; 3 ROSEMARY E. WILLIAMS, BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE HANDBOOK
§ 18:8 (2d ed. 2010).
31 See AHERN & MACLEAN, supra note 23, § 9014:1 (listing ‘objection to claim’ as a con-
tested matter).  Neither the filing of a proof of claim in bankruptcy nor an objection to claim
trigger an adversary proceeding. See, e.g., 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 23, ¶
7001.01 (“The filing and subsequent allowance of a proof of claim ordinarily does not com-
mence an adversary proceeding even if priority or security is also claimed.  The filing of an
objection to the allowance of a claim is governed by [Bankruptcy] Rule 3007 and com-
mences a contested matter governed by Rule 9014.”); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007,
advisory committee’s note (“The contested matter initiated by an objection to a claim is
governed by rule 9014, unless a counterclaim by the trustee is joined with the objection to
the claim.  The filing of a counterclaim ordinarily commences an adversary proceeding sub-
ject to the rules in Part VII.”).
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result primarily from the fact that contested matters are treated as motions.32
As one bankruptcy practitioner explains,
[M]ost contested matters proceed with a single motion, memorandum in opposition,
and reply memorandum, and a single hearing, without the need for more complicated
procedures.  If the dispute is factual in nature, the court may hold an “evidentiary
hearing” (i.e., trial) where the court hears testimony of witnesses.
Evidentiary hearings in contested matters typically differ from trials in that the
issues are more limited.  The court may order that the parties exchange witness and
exhibit lists, or file pretrial statements.  Typically, however, these are not necessary.
Contested matters are motion practice.  Most of the issues will be decided on the
basis of memoranda, and oral argument.  There is no constitutional right to a jury
trial in contested matters.33
The following section summarizes some of the ways the speedy and less-
elaborate procedures of contested matters reduce process costs when compared
to ordinary civil litigation under the Federal Rules.
B. Specific Procedures
1. Pleadings and Summary Judgment Motions
Contested matters are handled as motions.  Instead of the complaint and
answer used in ordinary civil litigation, the analogs to pleadings in a contested
matter are the motion itself, the opposing party’s memorandum in opposition
and perhaps a reply memorandum by the moving party.34  In this respect, con-
tested-matter practice under the Bankruptcy Rules resembles summary judg-
ment practice under the Federal Rules.  But, of course, summary judgment
under the Federal Rules involves a motion and memoranda after a complaint
and answer.35  By contrast, the motion and memoranda in a contested matter
are instead of a complaint and answer.  So the Bankruptcy Rules skip an entire
step and thus tend to increase speed and reduce process costs.
While summary judgment motions in contested matters are rare,36 the
speed and efficiency of summary judgment can be achieved in contested mat-
ters by simply not having an evidentiary hearing.  In contested matters, “[t]here
is no requirement to hold an evidentiary hearing where there are no disputed
issues of material fact.  Courts have also held that an evidentiary hearing was
32 AHERN & MACLEAN, supra note 23, § 9014:3 (“[A]n adversary proceeding is com-
menced by filing a complaint with the clerk, while a contested matter is generally com-
menced by service of the motion . . . .”); Wolfson, supra note 27, at 5 (“Bankruptcy Rule
9014 outlines the procedures applicable to contested matters.  Relief must be requested by a
motion in the bankruptcy case.”).
33 ELIZABETH A. KANE, What You Should Know About Bankruptcy Procedure and Litiga-
tion, in UNDERSTANDING THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 2005 IN HAWAII 19, 30-31
(2005).
34 “[M]ost contested matters proceed with a single motion, memorandum in opposition, and
reply memorandum, and a single hearing, without the need for more complicated proce-
dures.” Id. at 30.  “Counterclaims and third party practice [do] not apply” to contested mat-
ters. 1 HOWARD J. STEINBERG, BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION § 6:4 (2d ed. 2007).
35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)-(b) (summary judgment); FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a)(1)-(2) (complaint
and answer).
36 “Due to the expedited nature of most contested matters, summary judgment motions are
not often utilized since the underlying dispute is presented for hearing within a short time
period after the contested matter is initiated.” 1 STEINBERG, supra note 34, § 6:18.
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not necessary where there was an adequate factual record before the court prior
to the hearing.”37
That said, the gist of contested-matter practice is to quickly get to a hear-
ing, but with fewer filings (pleadings and motions) than precede a trial in ordi-
nary civil litigation.  This reduction of procedural steps in contested matters is
due to the emphasis on speed in bankruptcy proceedings.38
2. Discovery
The emphasis on speed in bankruptcy is especially evident at the discov-
ery stage of litigation.  Compared to ordinary civil litigation, contested matters
tend to involve less discovery and a faster pace.  This is reflected in the fact
that portions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 do not apply in a contested
matter unless the court directs otherwise.39  These are:
• Rule 26(a)(1) (mandatory disclosure)
• Rule 26(a)(2) (disclosures regarding expert testimony)
• Rule 26(a)(3)(additional pre-trial disclosure)
• Rule 26(f) (mandatory meeting before scheduling conference/discovery
plan)40
These rules are excepted because they are not compatible with the speed of
contested matters.41  Discovery can begin immediately in contested matters
because the Rule 26 disclosures do not apply.42
In addition, judges seem to be more likely to approve expedited discovery
in contested matters than in ordinary civil litigation.43  In a contested matter,
expediting discovery is often essential because the hearing is scheduled before
a response to a non-expedited discovery request would be due.44  In fact,
“[s]ome courts have adopted local rules that suspend application of the discov-
ery rules in contested matters, noting that the discovery rules would delay reso-
lution of the matters.  In a number of jurisdictions, the parties simply do not
follow the rules and the courts do not require strict enforcement of the rules.”45
37 Id. § 6:21 (footnote omitted).
38 See infra Part II.B.2-3.
39 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014.
40 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(c).
41 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 23, ¶ 9014.05.
42 Khackikyan v. Hahn (In re Khachikyan), 335 B.R. 121, 127 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
43 See 1 STEINBERG, supra note 34, § 4:5.  Expedited discovery is part of the general sense
of urgency in bankruptcy litigation:
It is not uncommon for a trial in an adversary proceeding or a hearing in a contested matter
to be scheduled in a relatively short period of time after the matter is at issue.  Such matters are
placed on a rapid time schedule because prolonged litigation is inimical to the goal of a rapid and
efficient administration of the bankruptcy estate.  When such scheduling is involved, it may be
necessary to engage in expedited discovery.  Expedited discovery is not often granted in nonban-
kruptcy litigation absent extraordinary circumstances.  Expedited discovery can be essential in
bankruptcy litigation, and bankruptcy courts may be more likely to grant such requests.
Id. (footnote omitted).
44 Id. § 6:19.
45 Id. § 4:5 (footnote omitted).
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Perhaps, too, bankruptcy lawyers are less likely than other litigators to
spar over discovery.46  The customary way to “play the game” of litigation in
bankruptcy courts may have evolved a speed and cooperativeness that reflect
all parties’ recognition that the pie over which they are fighting is too small to
allow a lot of it to be consumed in procedural disputes.47  As one bankruptcy
court put it:
Bankruptcy must be a more self regulating practice than other areas of law. . . .
[B]ankruptcy judges require maximum cooperation and tolerate minimum discovery
disputes.  This is because the nature of bankruptcy proceedings demands it.  Within a
given bankruptcy case, especially one as large as [this] proceeding, there could be
thousands of disputes.  If parties in these disputes refused to cooperate with discovery
. . . litigation costs would swallow the estate (and the court) and there would be
nothing left to distribute to creditors.  Further, in most bankruptcy cases there is an
expedited time frame.  In chapter 11s, if some tasks are not accomplished expediently
the plan could fail or the business might lose potential buyers.48
And as another bankruptcy court bluntly told a lawyer, “Your casual reference
to the need for months to take discovery runs completely contrary to the man-
ner in which bankruptcy cases are pursued.”49
3. Hearing and Appeal
Hearings on contested matters in bankruptcy tend to be faster and less
elaborate than trials in ordinary civil litigation.  Although the Federal Rules of
Evidence apply to bankruptcy cases,50 “most practitioners probably would
agree that they are not strictly enforced because almost all matters are tried by
the bankruptcy judge[,]”51 as opposed to a jury.52  Significantly, evidence in
46 Id. § 4:4 (“Generally, bankruptcy judges have little patience for discovery disputes.
Given the heightened pace of the proceedings, gamesmanship in the discovery process is an
ill advised strategy.”).  On the other hand, bankruptcy does offer opportunities for discovery
not found in ordinary civil litigation.  “Unlike in nonbankruptcy forums, a party has an
opportunity to engage in types of discovery prior to engaging in litigation, such as by asking
questions of the debtor at § 341(a) meeting or by conducting a Bankruptcy Rule 2004 exami-
nation.” Id. § 4:2.  Bankruptcy Rule 2004 provides that “the court may order the examina-
tion of any entity.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(a).  These examinations are similar to
depositions.  1 STEINBERG, supra note 34, § 4:25.  While a bankruptcy litigant may use dis-
covery under the Federal Rules, “Bankruptcy Rule 2004 represents a wholly separate discov-
ery scheme.”  8 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 19, § 160:4.
47 Overview of Bankruptcy Litigation, supra note 8, at 16 (“They say that the difference
between a litigator and a bankruptcy lawyer is that the bankruptcy lawyer goes to court.
This is true for one good, practical reason: The debtor in bankruptcy is sick, and if you fight
too long over the patient, you’ll have nothing left but a corpse.”).
48 In re LTV Steel Co., 307 B.R. 37, 48 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004).
49 SK-Palladin Partners, L.P. v. Platinum Entm’t, Inc., No. 01-C-7202, 2001 WL 1593154,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2001) (quoting the bankruptcy court in the same case) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
50 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017.
51 Wolfson, supra note 27, at 5-6.
52 The absence of a jury has long been associated with an informality about evidentiary
matters in bankruptcy court:
As a matter of history, bankruptcy has a tradition of laxity about matters of evidence.  There
is a tradition in bankruptcy wryly nicknamed “testimony from the podium,” describing situations
in which the judge bases her decision upon attorney proffer rather than sworn testimony (“Your
honor, if called to testify, my client would say . . .”).
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contested matters is often introduced by affidavit or declaration rather than oral
presentation in open court.53  All of this, of course, can speed up the process.
In addition, bankruptcy judges may be more likely than district judges to
advise the lawyers, as a cost-cutting measure, that they are not required to brief
a particular issue on which the judge has previously issued a written decision.54
One bankruptcy judge “suspect[s] this is [in part] due to the fact that [ban-
Our observation is that practice has tightened up some in recent years, and that the judge
will often compel counsel in bankruptcy proceedings to comply with basic evidentiary rules just
as in any other court.  In fact, a litigator who has a firm grasp of the rules of evidence will often
have a distinct advantage over her bankruptcy counterparts, simply because bankruptcy lawyers
tend to be less familiar with the rules of evidence.
Nevertheless, practice remains a bit more fluid and informal in many bankruptcy courts
compared to what you would encounter in federal district or state trial courts.  One possible
reason for this is the general absence of juries; because there is no jury to poison, the judge may
simply permit witnesses to tell their stories, confident in his ability to later disregard any inad-
missible portions.  Another explanation is that bankruptcy judges tend to look for practical busi-
ness solutions and may be more concerned about reaching a commercially appropriate result than
being bogged down with a “technical” dispute about the admissibility of any particular piece of
evidence.
As you might expect, lawyers will encounter substantial variation among judges with regard
to the level of formality in their courtrooms and the extent to which they require strict compli-
ance with the rules of evidence or demand complete evidentiary records to support factual
findings.
Overview of Bankruptcy Litigation, supra note 8, at 46.
53 AHERN & MACLEAN, supra note 23, § 9014:1 (“[E]vidence in an adversary proceeding
must be presented orally in open court . . . while evidence in a contested matter may be
presented on affidavits.”); 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 23, ¶ 9014.06
(“[D]isputed factual matters may be resolved on affidavits, but only ‘by agreement of the
parties.’”) (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014, advisory committee’s note to 2002 amend-
ment); 8 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 19, § 160:5 (“[S]ome courts permit introduction of
evidence in contested matters by affidavit; whereas, evidence in adversary proceedings typi-
cally requires oral presentation in open court.”); 2 HOWARD J. STEINBERG, BANKRUPTCY
LITIGATION § 8.4 (2d ed. 2007) (“In many instances, the hearing [on a contested matter] is
similar to hearings on motions that are brought in federal district court and it is not uncom-
mon for testimony to be introduced by means of declaration rather than through live wit-
nesses.”); Wolfson, supra note 27, at 6 (“Offers of proof are often used in bankruptcy cases
in lieu of testimony, particularly in contested matters.”).  “Most contested matter hearings
are resolved following the parties’ oral argument.  However, bankruptcy judges have discre-
tion whether to allow oral argument at a hearing.” 1 STEINBERG, supra note 34, § 6:21.
Similarly, most courts hold that district court judges have discretion to deny oral argument
on motions for summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court
may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”);
Langham-Hill Petroleum, Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 1330 (4th Cir. 1987); Cia.
Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 411 (1st Cir. 1985); Spark v.
Catholic Univ. of Am., 510 F.2d 1277, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. Howard, 459 F.2d
616, 620 (8th Cir. 1972). But see Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461–62 (9th Cir.
1964) (“[A] district court may not, by rule or otherwise, preclude a party from requesting
oral argument nor deny such a request when made by a party opposing the motion unless the
motion for summary judgment is denied.”).  And there is some authority for denying opening
and closing argument at trial.  75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 447 (2007); E-mail from Janice M.
Karlin, U.S. Bankr. Judge, Dist. of Kan., to Stephen J. Ware, Professor of Law, Univ. of
Kan. (June 16, 2010) [hereinafter Karlin E-mail] (on file with author).
54 See Karlin E-mail, supra note 53.
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krupcty judges] do see some repeat issues . . . more frequently than do our
colleagues on the district court bench.”55
The expedited pace of bankruptcy litigation continues at the appellate
stage, as appeals of bankruptcy court orders56 tend to be quicker than appeals
of other courts’ decisions.57  For example, in non-bankruptcy civil litigation in
federal court, the usual time to file a notice of appeal is thirty days,58 while the
time to appeal from a bankruptcy order is only fourteen days.59
C. Summary
Compared to ordinary civil litigation under the Federal Rules, bankruptcy
litigation uses procedures well-suited to providing quicker and cheaper adjudi-
cation, with correspondingly lower process costs.  Bankruptcy’s most common
form of litigation, the contested matter, uses an abbreviated motion-type pro-
cess that proceeds quickly to a hearing, with less discovery than occurs in ordi-
nary civil litigation.  Likely, another factor is a culture of bankruptcy litigation
that, compared to other litigation, places a greater emphasis on saving time and
money.
III. ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
A. The Basic Context
Arbitration, like litigation, is a form of binding adjudication.60  Litigation
is adjudication in a public (government) forum and arbitration is adjudication in
a private forum.61  Judges and jurors are the adjudicators in litigation, while
arbitrators, private individuals chosen by the disputing parties,62 are the adjudi-
cators in arbitration.
Litigation is the default process of dispute resolution; that is, parties can
contract into alternative processes of dispute resolution, but if they do not do
55 Id.
56 In some federal circuits, bankruptcy court decisions are appealed to the district court,
while in others they are appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. See, e.g., 1 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 5.02[3][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010).
57 KANE, supra note 33, at 57.
58 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
59 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002(a).
60 See, e.g., ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS 21 (4th ed. 2006) (“‘Adjudication’ refers to the process by which final, authorita-
tive decisions are rendered by a neutral third party who enters the controversy without previ-
ous knowledge of the dispute.”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978) (“[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in
the fact that it confers on the affected [disputing] party a peculiar form of participation in the
decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor.”).
Non-binding arbitration is a very different animal. See WARE, PRINCIPLES, supra note
7, § 4.32 (discussing the attributes of non-binding arbitration).  “Non-binding arbitration has
less in common with arbitration than it does with mediation and other processes in aid of
negotiation.” Id. § 2.2.
61 See generally RAU, supra note 60, at 596-620 (describing the process of arbitration); see
also 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 2.6.1 n.1 (1994) (describing
arbitration as a “form of adjudication.”).
62 See WARE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, § 2.36(a) (summarizing arbitrator selection).
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so, then each party retains the right to have the dispute resolved in litigation.
By contrast, a dispute does not go to arbitration unless the parties have con-
tracted to have an arbitrator resolve that dispute.63  In other words, arbitration
binds only those who contracted for it.64
Just as contracts largely determine which disputes will be resolved in arbi-
tration, they also largely determine which procedures will be used to resolve
those disputes.  While the rules of procedure and evidence in litigation are
enacted by government, in arbitration they are, “with few exceptions, whatever
the parties’ arbitration agreement says they are.”65  For this reason, arbitration
has been described as “the parties’ dream.”66
While parties could take the time to negotiate and draft an entire set of
procedural rules customized for their arbitration, most parties instead use “off-
the-rack” rules previously written by an arbitration organization like the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (AAA).67  For example, many pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements commit the parties to arbitrate according to the AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules.68  As the AAA Commercial Rules are common
63 See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (“[A]rbitration
is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute
which he has not agreed so to submit.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); First Options of
Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (“[A]rbitration is simply a matter of contract
between the parties . . . .”).  Non-contractual arbitration is less common and often must be
non-binding in order to avoid violating the constitutional right to jury trial. See WARE,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, §§ 2.2, 2.55.
64 See WARE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, § 2.3(a).  Contracting for arbitration can occur pre-
or post-dispute:
Sometimes parties with an existing dispute contract to send that dispute to arbitration.  Such
post-dispute arbitration agreements (or “submission agreements”) are relatively rare and non-
controversial.  More common, and more controversial, are pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
These are contracts containing a clause providing that, if a dispute arises, the parties will resolve
that dispute in arbitration, rather than litigation.  These arbitration clauses typically are written
broadly to cover any dispute the parties’ transaction might produce, but also can be written more
narrowly to cover just some potential disputes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
65 WARE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, § 2.35.
66 “The arbitration of an existing dispute is the parties’ dream, and they can make it what
they want it to be.” HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 310 (1994).  There are, however,
limits on the parties’ freedom of contract.  If the arbitration occurs and does not meet a
court’s definition of a “fundamentally fair hearing” then the court will grant a motion to
vacate the arbitration award (i.e. overturn the arbitrator’s ruling). WARE, PRINCIPLES, supra
note 7, § 2.44(c).  Also, courts have refused to send some disputes to arbitration when they
believe the agreed-upon procedures for arbitration are unfair. Id. § 2.35.
67 1 MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 8:22 (3d ed. 2010) (“The
majority of arbitration clauses in general commercial contracts might well follow the lan-
guage of a clause suggested by the American Arbitration Association: [quoting the clauses
quoted infra note 70]”); Stephen L. Hayford, Building a More Perfect Beast: Rethinking the
Commercial Arbitration Agreement, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 437, 440 (2009) (“[In the
drafting of commercial contracts,] designation of a neutral arbitration provider (e.g., the
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. . . . or the American Arbitration Associa-
tion . . .) and the concomitant accession to the proper variant of that provider’s commercial
arbitration rules is the norm.”).
68 Commercial Arbitration Rules & Mediation Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2009), http://
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 [hereinafter AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules] (providing a
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and fairly typical of other arbitration rules, they will be used below as examples
illustrative of typical procedural rules in arbitration.  Compared to ordinary
civil litigation under the Federal Rules, the AAA Commercial Rules are well-
suited to providing quicker and cheaper adjudication, with correspondingly
lower process costs.
B. Specific Procedures
1. Pleadings and Summary Judgment Motions
The complaint and answer in litigation have their analogs in arbitration,
although the complaint is typically called a demand for arbitration.69  Impor-
tantly, arbitration pleadings can be produced at lower cost than litigation plead-
ings because the pleadings in arbitration tend to be written more concisely, with
less legalese, than those in litigation.  As one nationally-known arbitrator and
co-author put it, “[a] statement of Claim or Demand for Arbitration is a far
different document than a Complaint in litigation.  A claim is much more infor-
mal than a pleading and is usually much shorter.  There are virtually no ‘rules
of pleading’ in arbitration . . . [and] technical pleading rules need not be
followed.”70
Compared to ordinary civil litigation, arbitration also typically proceeds
faster by omitting the summary judgment motion, which is less common in
arbitration than in litigation.71  While summary judgment is relatively rare in
arbitration, the speed and efficiency of summary judgment can be achieved in
arbitration, as in bankruptcy’s contested matters,72 by simply forgoing an evi-
dentiary hearing.  Courts have enforced awards by arbitrators who decided to
forgo live testimony, thus having the hearing on the documentary evidence sub-
standard arbitration clause: “Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this con-
tract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American
Arbitration Association under its Commercial Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award
rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.”).
69 WARE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, § 2.36(b).
70 Richard Chernick & Rufus V. Rhoades, How to Conduct a Complex Financial Arbitra-
tion Part 1: Matters to Consider Prior to the Hearings, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2004: A
RAPIDLY EVOLVING PROCESS 453, 456 (Practising Law Instit. ed., 2004).
71 See, e.g., In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 61, 64 n.3 (1983) (“[A]
summary judgment is extraordinary (although not unheard of) in arbitration proceedings.”);
Gary W. Jackson, Prosecuting Class Actions in Arbitration, in 1 ATLA ANNUAL CONVEN-
TION REFERENCE MATERIALS 829 (2006); Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild
West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123, 175 (2005)
(“There is an unspoken bias in [securities] arbitrations that panels should view dispositive
motions with much skepticism and proceed as a matter of course to a hearing.”); Harold M.
Brody & Anthony J. Oncidia, Careful What You Wish For: Is Arbitration the Employer’s
Panacea? Perhaps There is a Better Alternative, HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRAC. GUIDANCE,
Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 7, 8; Leslie A. Gordon, Clause For Alarm: As Arbitration Costs Rise, In-
House Counsel Turn to Mediation or a Combined Approach, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2006, at 19,
19; Sanford F. Young, Conventional Wisdoms or Mistakes: The Complaint and the
Response, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., June 2004, at 28, 29 (“[A]rbitrations are rarely, if ever, resolved
by pre-hearing dispositive motions (e.g., dismissal or summary judgment).”).
72 See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
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mitted.73  That said, the gist of most arbitration practice, like contested-matter
practice in bankruptcy,74 is to proceed quickly to a hearing with fewer filings
(pleadings and motions) than precede a trial in ordinary civil litigation.
2. Discovery
Arbitration, like a contested matter in bankruptcy,75 generally expedites
and reduces discovery.  However, the gap between discovery in litigation and
arbitration seems to be shrinking.  Seventeen years ago, the leading arbitration
treatise said: “Limitations on discovery, particularly judicially initiated discov-
ery, remain one of the hallmarks of American commercial arbitration . . . .”76
Now, though, one of the authors of that treatise says:
Arbitration hearings are now often preceded by extensive discovery, including depo-
sitions.  Because discovery has traditionally accounted for the bulk of litigation-
related costs, the importation of discovery into arbitration (which traditionally oper-
ated with little or no discovery) is particularly noteworthy.  Although many arbitra-
tors and some arbitration rules aim to hold the line on excessive discovery, it is not
unusual for legal advocates to agree to trial-like procedures for discovery, even to the
extent of employing standard civil procedural rules.77
Although arbitration discovery seems to be catching up to litigation dis-
covery, it has apparently not caught up yet, according to the bulk of observ-
73 See, e.g., British Ins. Co. of Cayman v. Water St. Ins. Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d 506, 517
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).  As one federal court explained:
Oral argument is not a necessary component of due process in all circumstances.  While hearings
are advisable in most arbitration proceedings, arbitrators are not compelled to conduct oral hear-
ings in every case.  The lack of oral hearings does not amount to the “denial of fundamental
fairness” required to warrant vacating the award.  As long as an arbitrator’s choice to render a
decision based solely on documentary evidence is reasonable, and does not render the proceeding
“fundamentally unfair,” the arbitrator is acting within the liberal sphere of permissible discretion.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT
§ 15 cmt. 3, 7 U.L.A. 58 (2009) (noting numerous courts have upheld an arbitrator’s author-
ity to grant a summary disposition); Burdette v. FSC Sec. Corp., No. 92-1030, 1993 WL
593997, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1993) (confirming an arbitral award in the nature of
summary judgment); Intercarbon Bermuda, Ltd. v. Caltex Trading & Transp. Corp., 146
F.R.D. 64, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (confirming an award after the arbitrator refused to conduct
oral hearing despite party’s repeated requests); Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman,
47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 660-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding an AAA arbitral award based
on summary adjudications); AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 68, at E-6
(“Where no party’s claim exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and arbitration costs, and
other cases in which the parties agree, the dispute shall be resolved by submission of docu-
ments, unless any party requests an oral hearing, or the arbitrator determines that an oral
hearing is necessary.  The arbitrator shall establish a fair and equitable procedure for the
submission of documents.”).  Professor Lisa Bernstein explains that the absence of a live
hearing is the norm in arbitration in the cotton industry. See Bernstein, supra note 16, at
1728 (“The [industry arbitration tribunal] does not hold hearings.  It decides cases solely on
the basis of briefs and documentary evidence . . . .”).
74 See supra Part II.B.1.
75 See supra Part II.B.2.
76 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 61, § 34.1.
77 Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 12 (footnotes omitted).
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ers.78  This may be because arbitrators tend to be more willing than judges to
intervene in discovery disputes and curtail discovery of marginally relevant
material.79
3. Hearing and Appeal
Arbitration hearings, like hearings of contested matters in bankruptcy,80
tend to be faster and less elaborate than trials in ordinary civil litigation.  As
noted above,81 the rules of evidence tend not to be strictly enforced in bank-
ruptcy hearings and this point is even more generally true of arbitration hear-
ings.82  The AAA Commercial Rules state that “[c]onformity to legal rules of
evidence shall not be necessary.”83  In arbitration, as in bankruptcy contested
matters,84 evidence is often introduced by affidavit or declaration, rather than
oral presentation in open court.85 Relatedly, arbitration can reduce process
78 See, e.g., 3 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, OEHMKE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 89.1 (3d ed.
2009) (describing the discovery process in arbitration as “skeletal if not missing.”).  A party
seeking discovery generally must meet a higher burden in arbitration than in litigation:
The standard for arbitration discovery is necessity, not convenience.  This is a departure from the
standard in trial practice where one need only show that the discovery request, if fulfilled, may
uncover potentially relevant and material evidence.  Courts strongly favor liberal discovery.  In
arbitration, however, the presumption is reversed and a convincing case must be made that the
information sought is essential.
Id. § 89.3; see also DRAHOZAL, supra note 11, at 418-19 (“Sophisticated commercial parties
who agree to arbitration are willing to trade a reduced ability to discover facts in the other
side’s possession for a reduction in litigation costs.”); Bruce A. McAllister & Amy Bloom,
Evidence in Arbitration, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 35, 42 (2003) (“It is axiomatic that discovery
is not as available in arbitration as it may be in court litigation.”); David S. Schwartz,
Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1268 (2009) (“[L]imits
on discovery (and to a lesser extent on pretrial motion practice) hold down the actual costs of
arbitration relative to litigation.”).
79 See Gale R. Peterson, Trade Secret Law Update 2008: Including Restrictive Post-
Employment Covenants, in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY,
at 799, 943 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2008).  Several factors influence an arbitrator’s role in
the discovery process:
Astute arbitrators, not bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (or similar state court
rules), and who, unlike federal and state court judges, are being paid for their time, typically on a
hourly rate, have more incentive for acting to curtail unnecessary discovery. . . .  Thus, some
arbitrations are well-managed—some are not—but well-manage[d] arbitrations have the ability
to pare down the mountains of discovery to manageable levels.
Id.
80 See supra Part II.B.3.
81 See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
82 “In many arbitrations, there are no rules of evidence.  The parties can present whatever
evidence they like and the arbitrators can give to it whatever weight they like.” WARE,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, § 2.37(c).  On the other hand, Professor Thomas L. Stipanowich
lists the tendency of arbitrators “to be very liberal in the admission of evidence” as a factor
that may prolong hearings.  Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 15.
83 AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 68, at R-31.
84 See supra text accompanying note 53.
85 Bernstein, supra note 16, at 1728 (“The [cotton industry arbitration tribunal] does not
hold hearings.  It decides cases solely on the basis of briefs and documentary evidence, most
commonly: verified copies of confirmations, correspondence, mail receipts, telephone logs,
weight slips, quality determination reports, and affidavits from lawyers and employees who
played roles in the questioned transaction.”) (emphasis added); Ariana R. Levinson, Lawyer-
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costs by having direct examinations of witnesses presented to the arbitrator
prior to the hearing, with the hearing “then limited to cross-examination, and
any redirect examination.  Doing so offers the benefit of reducing hearing/trial
time.”86
Another factor often cited as a reason why arbitration hearings tend to be
completed faster than trials is that the arbitrators tend to be more willing and
able than judges to conform to the parties’ preferred schedule.  This deference
to the parties’ schedule also saves lawyers from the cost of preparing for trial
and then, if the court reschedules the trial, having to prepare again.87  As one
trial lawyer explains, “[a]rbitration moves faster than trial as the arbitrators
rarely have any other substantial business to take care of during the arbitration.
There is no waiting for the last juror who missed his bus to arrive, ten minute
breaks are rarely more than 15 minutes long, and arbitrators are not shy about
telling you [the lawyer presenting a case] to move on.”88
ing Skills, Principles and Methods Offer Insights as to Best Practices for Arbitration, 60
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 45 (2008) (“In some arbitrations, parties submit the entire case, or parts
of the case, in written form.  Some have suggested that all direct testimony should be submit-
ted on paper with only live cross-examination.  Others have suggested that only key wit-
nesses should be presented live, with others being presented in paper form.”) (footnotes
omitted); Robert A. Merring, Discovery in Contractual Arbitrations: “What Do You Mean I
Can’t Serve Interrogatories?,” ORANGE COUNTY LAW., June 2006, at 18, 18 (“That most
arbitrations do not apply the formal rules of evidence, and allow the use of affidavits, decla-
rations, and telephonic testimony, also obviate the need for much traditional discovery.”);
Edna Sussman, Why Arbitrate? The Benefits and Savings, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., Oct. 2009, at 20,
24 (“The conduct of the hearing can be expedited by (1) presenting direct testimony by
affidavit; (2) limiting the time available for the hearing and, if appropriate, using the “chess
clock method” to assure equal time; (3) using telephone and video conferencing technology;
(4) choosing a hearing location that minimizes expenses to the parties; (5) conferencing or
“hot tubbing” the experts; (6) using a single expert to advise the arbitrators rather than hav-
ing the parties offer competing experts; and (7) limiting post-hearing submissions.”); Young,
supra note 71, at 29 (“[R]ules of evidence are generally only loosely applied, with hearsay
statements (including affidavits) and documents usually freely admitted.”); see also AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 68, at R-32 (“The arbitrator may receive and
consider the evidence of witnesses by declaration or affidavit, but shall give it only such
weight as the arbitrator deems it entitled to after consideration of any objection made to its
admission. . . .  If the parties agree or the arbitrator directs that documents or other evidence
be submitted to the arbitrator after the hearing, the documents or other evidence shall be filed
with the AAA for transmission to the arbitrator.  All parties shall be afforded an opportunity
to examine and respond to such documents or other evidence.”).
86 Peterson, supra note 79, at 944.
87 Id.  Unlike litigation, arbitration is generally free of scheduling issues and associated
delays and costs:
An undeniable advantage of arbitration . . . is that the parties for the most part are able to choose
the timing and length of the hearing/trial, which renders scheduling easier than waiting on a court
“call docket” for trial on relatively short prior notice.  In jurisdictions with congested court dock-
ets, the time to hearing/trial may be substantially shortened, but also counsel do not need to
prepare for trial—and then prepare again for trial when a first setting is passed, and so on, and so
on.  Costs and delay may be reduced for that reason as well.
Id.
88 Mark L.D. Wawro, Advocacy in Arbitration: Article 2—Practitioner’s Perspective,
ADVOC., Winter 2003, at 42, 44; see also DRAHOZAL, supra note 11, at 28 (“Another reason
why arbitration might result in faster dispute resolution than litigation is that it enables the
parties to avoid a queue.  In court, a lawsuit is added to the judge’s docket behind previously
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Finally, arbitrators often have expertise on the subject matter of the dis-
pute, and this expertise may relieve the lawyers of the need to lay the sort of
factual and evidentiary foundations required in court.89  (This is yet another
similarity between arbitration and bankruptcy litigation because bankruptcy
judges hear only bankruptcy cases and thus develop an expertise in the subjects
that frequently recur in bankruptcy cases.)
Compared to ordinary civil litigation, arbitration’s speed continues at the
decision and appeal stages.  Arbitrators’ decisions, called arbitration awards,
are generally delivered quickly.90  For example, the AAA Commercial Rules
require the arbitrator to deliver the award within 30 days from the end of the
hearing.91  This shortened time frame is easier for an arbitrator than a judge
because unlike judicial decisions, commercial arbitration awards rarely contain
any reasoning.92  Similar to the typical jury verdict, the typical arbitration
filed cases.  In arbitration, if the parties wish, they can choose an arbitrator who has no
backlog, or at least less of a backlog than there would be in court.”).
89 Jackson Williams & Morgan Lynn, Public Citizen Releases the Costs of Arbitration,
PIABA B.J., Summer 2002, at 49, 51 (“Relaxing the rules of evidence to permit hearsay
testimony, such as testimony by affidavit or deposition, or the use of business records with-
out ‘foundation’ testimony, can shorten proceedings.”).
90 1 DOMKE, supra note 67, at § 34.1 (3d ed. 2010). The amount of time an arbitrator is
given to make a decision is largely determined by the parties themselves:
The parties to an arbitration fix the time within which an award must be made, either by a
specific agreement or by accepting the rules of an agency referred to in their arbitration clause.
Parties enjoy considerable freedom in this regard.  For example, provision that the award be
rendered within five days after the appointment of the third arbitrator was not considered
“unworkable” since it was consistent “with one of the principal purposes of arbitration which is
to reach a speedy final result to avoid protracted litigation.”  Time limits which the parties have
set may usually not be altered by the arbitrator or the administrator of arbitration because it
would amount to an alteration of the parties’ contract by a nonparty to the contractual agreement.
Id. (quoting Joseph F. Mittelman Corp. v. Murray L. Spies Corp., 129 N.Y.S.2d 822, 828
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954)).
91 AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 68, at R-41.  “[P]arties sometimes under-
score their wish for an expedited result by providing in the arbitration clause, for example,
that there will be an award within a specified number of months of the notice of intention to
arbitrate and that the arbitrator(s) must agree to the time constraints before accepting
appointment.” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES—A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 32 (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4125.
92 See AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 68, at R-42(b) (“The arbitrator need
not render a reasoned award unless the parties request such an award in writing prior to
appointment of the arbitrator or unless the arbitrator determines that a reasoned award is
appropriate.”); 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 6, §§ 3.2.3, 37.4.1; Alan Scott Rau, The Cul-
ture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 449, 512 (2005)
(“[A]rbitrators—particularly in commercial cases—are not expected to write reasoned opin-
ions attempting to explain and justify their decisions, and the AAA in fact has traditionally
discouraged them from doing so.”); Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in
International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 367 (2007) (“[D]omestic tribunals routinely issue
awards that do not include articulated reasons.”).
While commercial arbitration in the United States generally does not produce a rea-
soned award, “ICSID and labor arbitration depart radically from this model, and interna-
tional commercial arbitration departs to a lesser degree.”  W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward
a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895, 1914 (2010); see also
2 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2450-51 (2009) (“It is now a
nearly universal principle that international arbitral awards must set forth the reasons for the
tribunal’s decision, as well as containing a dispositive section specifying the relief ordered
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award consists of a few sentences finding liability and awarding damages to the
injured party.93
While arbitration awards are not technically “appealed” to courts, they can
be vacated by courts.94  Whether called an “appeal” or not, any process after
the initial adjudicator’s decision raises the process costs of adjudication.  One
way to reduce these costs over the run of cases is for higher courts to affirm the
vast majority of decisions by initial adjudicators, to give such initial decisions
more finality and thus deter parties from appealing.  This has generally been the
case with courts’ treatment of arbitration awards.95  The Federal Arbitration
Act’s grounds for vacating an arbitration award are narrow,96 so vacatur is
quite rare.97
C. Summary
Compared to civil litigation under the Federal Rules, arbitration tends to
be quicker and cheaper with correspondingly lower process costs.  These sav-
ings come from a process that proceeds more quickly to a hearing, with less
elaborate pleadings, discovery and motion practice than occur in ordinary civil
litigation.  Likely, other savings come from arbitrators accommodating parties’
schedules more than judges do.
IV. QUESTIONS SUGGESTED BY THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN
ARBITRATION AND BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION
A. Any Lessons for Ordinary Civil Litigation under the Federal Rules?
If bankruptcy litigation and arbitration are quicker and cheaper than ordi-
nary civil litigation under the Federal Rules, should the Federal Rules be
amended to more resemble the practice in bankruptcy and arbitration?98  This
by the tribunal.  This requirement for a reasoned award is reflected in international arbitra-
tion conventions, national law and institutional rules, and plays a central role in the interna-
tional arbitral process.”); Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AM.
ARB. ASS’N, R. 39(c) (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904#39 (“The award
shall be in writing and shall be signed by a majority of the arbitrators and shall provide the
written reasons for the award unless the parties agree otherwise. It shall be executed in the
manner required by law.”).
93 WARE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, § 2.37(e); see also Weidemaier, supra note 92, at 1914
(“Unreasoned awards do not find facts, state conclusions of law, offer reasons, or provide
any information relevant to future disputes beyond certain basic facts: a dispute happened, it
involved parties A and B, and party A won.”).
94 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006) (providing grounds for vacating an arbitration award).
95 Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of
Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 592 (2007) (“[L]imited
appellate review encourages finality and discourages parties from pursuing dubious, costly
appeals”); Williams & Lynn, supra note 89, at 52 (“Public Citizen agrees that proponents of
arbitration are undoubtedly correct that the limited, narrow grounds upon which an arbitra-
tion award can be appealed will reduce litigation costs.  Parties will avoid paying court
reporters to record or transcribe hearings or appellate attorneys to write briefs.”).
96 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
97 WARE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, § 2.43(a).
98 A few thoughtful articles have, as Professor Michael Moffitt says, “suggested that the
civil litigation system might have some things to learn from some of the customizing aspects
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may not be entirely possible for several reasons, including the civil jury.  While
a civil jury trial rarely, if ever, occurs in a bankruptcy contested matter99 or in
arbitration,100 the Seventh Amendment and its state constitutional equivalents
guarantee a civil jury trial in much ordinary civil litigation.101  Some of the
ways in which the Federal Rules require more elaborate procedures than those
used in bankruptcy litigation or arbitration can be traced to the civil jury.
Examples include broad discovery and complex rules of evidence.102  To the
extent jury trials require more elaborate procedures than occur in bankruptcy
litigation or arbitration, the Federal Rules are hindered in attempts to foster
quicker and cheaper adjudication.
Even if the Federal Rules could be amended to resemble the procedures of
bankruptcy litigation and arbitration, such an amendment may not be desirable.
Perhaps the more-elaborate procedures of the Federal Rules are more appropri-
ate for the types of disputes typically resolved in ordinary civil litigation, while
the less-elaborate procedures of bankruptcy and arbitration are more appropri-
ate for the types of disputes typically resolved in those fora.  In other words,
perhaps these various adjudication procedures are doing pretty well at achiev-
ing the ADR movement’s goal of “fitting the forum to the fuss.”103  Some
of arbitration.”  Michael Moffitt, Islands, Vitamins, Salt, Germs: Four Visions of the Future
of ADR in Law Schools (and a Data-Driven Snapshot of the Field Today), 25 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 25, 46 n.35 (2010) (citing Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case
for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007); Henry S.
Noyes, supra note 95; Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181
(2006)).  Earlier scholars pointed out that “arbitration procedures can be used as a criterion
for evaluating the efficiency of the public judicial system.”  William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 249 (1979).
99 See, e.g., Diamant v. Kasparian (In re S. Cal. Plastics, Inc.), 165 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th
Cir. 1999) (“[B]ecause the allowance of a claim is a contested matter, the proceeding is
before the bench not a jury.”); WILLIAMS, supra note 30, § 18:8 (“These matters are dis-
posed of through a summary hearing—not a trial, and are heard in bankruptcy court without
any suggestion of a jury right.  These types of proceedings are called contested matters
. . . .”).  Contested matters are unlikely to be actions at law, to which the jury-right attaches,
as opposed to actions in equity. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (listing common
contested matters).  Even a creditor’s money-damages claim against the debtor in bank-
ruptcy, like the paradigm breach-of-contract claim discussed supra text accompanying notes
10-11, is on the equity, rather than law, side. See Stephen J. Ware, Bankruptcy Law’s Treat-
ment of Creditors’ Jury-Trial and Arbitration Rights, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 479,
483-84 (2009).  Other bankruptcy litigation very rarely leads to a civil jury trial.
100 I suppose it theoretically could occur if an agreement provided that the arbitration panel
would be a dozen random citizens.
101 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
102 Stephen J. Ware, Consumer and Employment Arbitration Law in Comparative Perspec-
tive: The Importance of the Civil Jury, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865, 868-70 (2002).
103 This phrase was apparently coined by “the late Columbia University School of Law
professor and judicial reform advocate Maurice Rosenberg.”  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Main-
taining ADR Integrity, ALTERNATIVES, Jan. 2009, at 1, 7; see also Maurice Rosenberg, Let
the Tribunal Fit the Case, Introductory Remarks at the American Association of Law
Schools Symposium: Current Developments in Judicial Administration (Dec. 28, 1977), in
80 F.R.D. 147, 166 (1977) (advocating “let[ting] the forum fit the fuss” by “establishing
criteria for channeling matters into dispute resolution mechanisms.”).  Seminal cites include
Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly
Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994); Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties
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disputes are suited to a quick and cheap process, while other disputes warrant
spending the additional time and money on a more elaborate process.  A sensi-
ble system would incur larger process costs for larger disputes and smaller pro-
cess costs for smaller disputes.
This common-sense idea is evident in all three sets of procedures: arbitra-
tion, bankruptcy litigation, and ordinary civil litigation.  While arbitration tends
to be relatively quick and cheap, this is especially so for smaller, more routine,
claims and less so for complex, high-dollar disputes.  Similarly, while bank-
ruptcy litigation also tends to be relatively quick and cheap, this is especially so
for contested matters and less so for adversary proceedings.104  And while the
Federal Rules apply to all cases in federal district court, the state analogs to the
Federal Rules tend not to apply in small claims courts and other courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction, which generally use a quicker and cheaper adjudication pro-
cess that more resembles arbitration or bankruptcy litigation.105  In short, to
some extent all three systems adjust, adding or reducing process, to reflect the
nature of the particular dispute.
B. How Do Parties Choose between Bankruptcy Litigation and Arbitration?
This Article has suggested that bankruptcy litigation and arbitration both
tend to be quicker and less elaborate, and therefore less expensive, than ordi-
nary civil litigation.  If bankruptcy litigation and arbitration share these same
procedural virtues, then how do parties choose between bankruptcy litigation
and arbitration?  For example, why do some parties seek to opt out of bank-
ruptcy litigation and into arbitration?  Why would a party want to pay for the
arbitration process when a similar process subsidized by the government, bank-
ruptcy litigation, is the alternative?106
First, it should be noted that many of the parties who seek to opt out of
bankruptcy litigation and into arbitration are seeking to opt out of litigating an
adversary proceeding, rather than a contested matter.107  As explained above,
litigation of an adversary proceeding is conducted under procedures similar to
the Federal Rules that govern ordinary (non-bankruptcy) civil litigation.108  So,
for these parties, the appeal of arbitration as a substitute for bankruptcy litiga-
of Dispute Processing, Address at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissat-
isfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 111-14 (1976)
(recommending that courts offer parties a range of dispute resolution procedures and help
them choose among them).
104 See supra Part II.A.
105 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 116.210-.270 (West 2006) (codifying separate rules
of procedure for claims under $7,500); FLA. SM. CL. R. §§ 7.010–.175 (West 2008) (estab-
lishing separate rules of procedure for claims under $5,000); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§§ 28.001-.055 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (setting separate rules of procedure governing
justice courts in claims under $5,000).
106 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 451 (2010) (“We start with the
expectation that well-informed people do not ordinarily pay thousands of dollars to get what
they can get elsewhere for free.  So, we ask, why any sophisticated parties choose to do that
with respect to binding adjudication.  Why do they choose arbitration over litigation?”).
107 See Ware, supra note 99, at 487 n.38 (citing cases).
108 See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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tion may be quite similar to the appeal arbitration has for parties seeking to
avoid the elaborate procedures of non-bankruptcy civil litigation.
More difficult to explain, however, is why some parties seek arbitration,
rather than litigation, of contested matters in bankruptcy.109  Contested matters
are subject to a less elaborate form of litigation that shares many of the same
procedural virtues as arbitration.110  So we might expect that few parties would
seek arbitration, rather than litigation, of contested matters in bankruptcy.  And,
in fact, relatively few reported cases involve parties seeking arbitration, rather
than litigation, of contested matters in bankruptcy.111  Maybe the bulk of par-
ties who could successfully argue for arbitration of their contested matters
choose instead to have these matters remain in court and maybe they do so
because they anticipate no process-cost savings from the arbitration alternative.
Other hypotheses might also explain why some parties seek arbitration
rather than bankruptcy litigation.  Perhaps it is simply a matter of seeking a
favorable adjudicator.  Perhaps parties seeking arbitration rather than litigation
of their contested matters are typically creditors who think arbitrators tend to be
more pro-creditor than bankruptcy judges, and bankruptcy judges more pro-
debtor than arbitrators.  Perhaps these arbitration-seeking creditors also prefer
the relative confidentiality of arbitration over the greater openness of bank-
ruptcy litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The process of litigating contested matters in bankruptcy courts differs
from the process of ordinary civil litigation under the Federal Rules.  And the
bankruptcy litigation process differs from the Federal Rules in many of the
same ways that the arbitration process tends to differ from the Federal Rules.
In sum, compared to ordinary civil litigation under the Federal Rules, both
bankruptcy litigation and arbitration use procedures well-suited to providing
quicker and cheaper adjudication, with correspondingly lower process costs.
These savings of time and money are generally achieved through: (1) fewer and
shorter pleadings and dispositive motions, (2) expedited and abbreviated dis-
covery, and (3) hearings less attendant to formalities such as rules of evidence.
In addition, factors not found in the “law in the books,” such as a culture of
speed and cooperativeness among bankruptcy lawyers and arbitrators’ tendency
to accommodate parties’ schedules more than judges do, seem to play a role.
The savings achieved in bankruptcy litigation and arbitration may not be
available in ordinary civil litigation because of the constitutional right to jury
trial.  And even if these savings could be achieved by amending the Federal
Rules, such an amendment might not be desirable.  The more-elaborate proce-
dures of the Federal Rules may be appropriate for the sorts of disputes typically
resolved in ordinary civil litigation, while the less-elaborate procedures of
109 For examples of cases allowing creditors’ to pursue against debtors in bankruptcy claims
that would otherwise have apparently been contested matters, see Ware, supra note 99, at
482 n.16.
110 See supra Parts II.B, III.B.
111 See Ware, supra note 99, at 482 n.16 (citing only six cases).
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bankruptcy and arbitration may be appropriate for the sorts of disputes typically
resolved in those fora.
While these sorts of plausible considerations might explain why the Fed-
eral Rules differ from the Bankruptcy Rules and arbitration rules, the similari-
ties between bankruptcy litigation and arbitration leave parties with interesting
choices about whether to use arbitration as an alternative to bankruptcy litiga-
tion.  In particular, questions remain about why some parties choose arbitration
over the procedures bankruptcy litigation uses for contested matters.
